The impact of the irrelevant - Temporary buy-options and bidding behavior in online auctions by Peeters, R.J.A.P. et al.
  
 
The impact of the irrelevant - Temporary buy-options
and bidding behavior in online auctions
Citation for published version (APA):
Peeters, R. J. A. P., Strobel, M., Vermeulen, A. J., & Walzl, M. (2007). The impact of the irrelevant -
Temporary buy-options and bidding behavior in online auctions. METEOR, Maastricht University School of
Business and Economics. METEOR Research Memorandum, No. 027
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2007
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 20 Jun. 2020
Ronald Peeters, Martin Strobel, Dries Vermeulen, 
Markus Walzl 
 
The impact of the irrelevant – Temporary buy-
options and bidding behavior in online auctions 
 
RM/07/027 
 
 
JEL code: C72, C91, D44, D82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maastricht research school of Economics 
of TEchnology and ORganizations 
 
Universiteit Maastricht 
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration 
P.O. Box 616 
NL - 6200 MD Maastricht 
 
phone : ++31 43 388 3830 
fax : ++31 43 388 4873 
 
 
 
 
 
The impact of the irrelevant – Temporary buy-options and
bidding behavior in online auctions∗
Ronald Peeters
†
Martin Strobel
‡
Dries Vermeulen
§
Markus Walzl
¶
June 2007
Abstract
In a laboratory experiment, we investigate the impact of temporary buy-options on ef-
ficiency, revenues, and bidding behavior in online proxy-auctions when bidders have in-
dependent private valuations. We show that the introduction of a buy-option reduces
efficiency and at the same time fails to enhance revenues. In particular, we observe that
the former presence of a temporary buy-option lowers final prices in an auction (even
though the option is no longer available once an auction has started). If bidders have
imprecise information about their private value, auction prices are increasing in the price
of the buy-option which suggests anchoring as an explanation. Surprisingly, the former
presence of a temporary buy-option also tends to reduce final auction prices if bidders
are perfectly informed about their private value. In fact, we demonstrate that bidders
are reluctant to bid above the option price regardless of the precision of their private
information and the price of the option.
Keywords: Online Auctions, Experiments, Buy-options
JEL lassification: C72, C91, D44, D82
1 Introduction
Online auctions seem to evolve as the terms-of-trade in a globalized world. eBay—the most
successful Consumer-to-Consumer (C2C) market place—reported for the first quarter of 2006
a net revenue of 1.4 billion US $. On average the auction houses’ web-page enjoys 1.2 billion
hits per day leading to 345 million search requests per day (see eBay (2006)). This suc-
cess is usually attributed to substantially reduced search (or more general transaction) costs
compared to more conventional trading mechanisms, and a better matching of demand and
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supply due to the mere size of the platform. While improved matching and reduced transac-
tion costs are expected to force prices of similar products to converge, empirical investigations
of online auctions show a surprisingly persistent price dispersion (see e.g. Roth and Ocken-
fels (2002), Lee and Malmendier (2006), or Dodonova and Koroshilov (2004)) even though
the trade mechanism is always a proxy auction.1 The burgeoning (theoretical) literature on
auction design offers many explanations why design details such as a particular ending rule
or a reserve price may well influence the final price of an auction (see e.g. Milgrom (2004)
for an overview or as an example Ockenfels and Roth (2006) for the case of ending rules).2
Numerous empirical studies confirm the predictive power of these theoretical models (see e.g.
Roth and Ockenfels (2002) or Katkar and Reiley (2006)) and demonstrate their usefulness as
a guideline for buyers and sellers at (online) auction houses.3
Recently, a particular design tool offered by online auctions has attracted a lot of at-
tention: Buy-it-now-options (henceforth, BIN options) provide an opportunity for the seller
to announce a price at which s/he is willing to sell the commodity directly.4 Around one
third of all deals at e.g., eBay are fixed price transactions (according to Wall Street Journal,
05/25/2006). eBay’s annual report (eBay (2006)) indicates that 30 % of gross merchandize
sales (roughly 5 billion US $) are purchases through buy-options. Theoretically, the opportu-
nity to trade at a fixed price is inferior for the seller as it avoids competitive bidding. It can,
however, also become revenue enhancing, because fixed price transactions avoid waiting time
in an auction or offer an insurance against (uncertain) final auction prices—both enhancing
the value from a buyer’s perspective and/or the revenue of the seller.5
A growing empirical literature tries to estimate the revenue-effects of BIN options and
thereby to decide which of the theoretical effects dominates. Durham et al. (2004) utilize data
from a field experiment with eBay coin auctions to demonstrate that auctions with a BIN
option lead to significantly higher revenues than those without. In their dataset, BIN options
1In a proxy auction participants are asked to submit their willingness to pay to an automatized bid agent
who overbids other bid agents as long as the current price is below the submitted willingness to pay. It is easy
to see that this format is equivalent to a second price sealed bid auction.
2The traditional literature on auction design focuses on monopolistic auctioneers who maximize their rev-
enue. However, e.g.,Peters and Severinov (1997) or Ellison et al. (2003) show that heterogenous auction
designs—and revenues—can also be sustained in an equilibrium of a game between competing auctioneers
(like e.g., sellers in online auctions) who offer similar commodities.
3For an overview of the growing theoretical and empirical literature on online-auctions see Ockenfels et al.
(2006).
4At most auction sites including eBay and biz.com, the option is no longer available if a potential buyer
submitted a bid and (as a consequence) the auction started. These options are typically referred to as tem-
porary. Some auction sites like Yahoo or Amazon offer buy-options that remain valid throughout the auction
process (referred to as permanent). For a theoretical investigation of the different designs see Reynolds and
Wooders (2006). Our study focuses on temporary options.
5We summarized the most important theoretical results in Appendix A. For a detailed analysis see e.g.,
Budish and Takeyama (2001), Reynolds and Wooders (2006), and Matthews and Katzman (2006). A compre-
hensive overview of the various theories and empirical investigations into buy-options can be found in Ockenfels
et al. (2006), Section 5.
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were used almost exclusively by sellers with a high reputation, and the authors demonstrate
that this may well explain the entire price dispersion. Hendricks et al. (2005) analyze data
from auctions of a particular Texas Instruments calculator and also find significantly higher
revenues for auctions with a BIN option. But as auctions with BIN option also exhibited
significantly higher minimum bid requirements, it is impossible to pin down the sole influence
of the BIN option.6 Finally, Dodonova and Koroshilov (2004) use a dataset of bracelet
auctions at biz.com to show that final auction prices are increasing in the BIN price (for a
given bracelet with identical product descriptions). They suggest that this result is driven
by anchoring to (irrelevant) information given by the BIN price—a price that is after all
irrelevant in private value auctions once the auction has started.7 Other studies support the
general conclusion that cognitive bounds and biases are rather important to understand real-
life market performance. Lee and Malmendier (2006), for instance, investigate board-game
auctions at eBay and find that final prices are on average higher if the seller states a higher
retail price. They attribute this result to anchoring as well.
All in all, empirical studies hardly manage to isolate the revenue (and efficiency) effect of
BIN options. The multitude of confounding factors (such as seller’s reputation, other design
tools, retail prices etc.) and the endogenous choice to participate in an auction imposes
restrictions on the analysis of field data. Moreover, while theories on revenue effects of BIN
options are nested in a private value framework, auctions of e.g., coins clearly exhibit a strong
common value component. According to a recent study by Shahriar and Wooders (2006), BIN
options can be hardly revenue enhancing in a common value framework as long as bidders
behave rational. However, they demonstrate potential positive revenue effects of the option
in a model with boundedly rational bidders who do not correctly anticipate the winner’s
curse. The multitude of confounding factors and the crucial role of value-generation therefore
suggests a laboratory experiment which is able to control for these issues and allows for a
better judgement of the explanatory power of standard theory next to models that explicitly
encounter cognitive limits.
In this laboratory study, we want to abstract from common (or interdependent) value
components and any confounding impact by other design tools or reputational issues and
fully concentrate on the behavioral aspects of the introduction (and price) of a BIN option.
We endow participants with private valuations that are independently drawn from the same
(uniform) distribution. Moreover, participants are assigned to a certain auction. Finally,
6A similar conclusion has been reached by Anderson and Singh (2004). In their dataset of Palm Pilot
auctions on eBay they observe that high-volume sellers typically use a combination of a BIN option and a low
minimum bid. Yet again, the effect of the BIN option is hard to disentangle from reputational effects and the
impact of other design tools (i.e., the minimum bid) due to the lack of heterogeneity.
7Anchoring is a feature of heuristics for decision making under uncertainty that labels the psychological
bias to adjust beliefs to new information in an insufficient way, or to use irrelevant information as an anchor
for decision making in uncertain environments (see Tversky and Kahneman (1965)).
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the only design tool we vary across treatments is the BIN option (i.e., its presence and its
price—high or low) such that the respective impact can be isolated. To identify the relevance
of anchoring we vary the precision of the participants’ information about their private value:
For a given BIN price, we conduct a treatment where participants precisely know their private
value (certainty environment), and another treatment where they only know an interval for
the respective private value (uncertainty environment).
We find the following set of results. First of all, the higher the option price the less
popular the option and the higher efficiency in the certainty environment. In particular,
introducing the option unambiguously reduces efficiency. These results do not carry over
to the uncertainty environment where the presence and price of an option does not have
significant influence on efficiency. Second—and maybe more surprisingly—the introduction
of a BIN option unambiguously reduces the seller’s revenue, independent of the BIN price or
the precision of information about private values. This result can be traced back to the fact
that the (former) presence of a BIN option tends to reduce the final price of the auction. Recall
that the option is no longer available once an auction started and its price is expected to be
completely irrelevant for the bidders as it does not effect their private value (and the weakly
dominant strategy to reveal it). Nonetheless, we observe that less bids are submitted above a
given BIN price than in a treatment without BIN. This lends support to the hypothesis that
anchoring plays a role in our setting.
Recall that in the certainty treatment subjects are informed about their own valuation
but remain uninformed about their opponents’ valuation. Hence, the BIN price can only
serve as an anchor for the values of the other subjects or a fictitious auctioneer’s willingness
to accept. The literature on overbidding in second-price auctions (see e.g., Andreoni et al.
(2005) and Cooper and Fang (2006)) and on social preferences (see e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999)) indicates that information about other bidders’ values
or the seller’s willingness to accept indeed displays relevant information and may eventually
influence bidding behavior. In fact, we demonstrate that high BIN prices discourage bidding
which suggests that bidders indeed take the BIN price as a reference point for the values
of other bidders and consider the case of a high BIN price as a “mission impossible”. In
the uncertainty treatments, however, subjects are also uncertain about their own valuation
(which is a relevant piece of information even if they stick to the weakly dominant strategy
to reveal it). Indeed, final auction prices are highest without BIN option followed by the case
of a high BIN price and lowest with a low BIN price—in line with the hypothesis that bidders
consider the BIN price as a signal for their own valuation.
We regard this study as an indicator for the importance of behavioral aspects in the design
of electronic market places. In particular, we demonstrate how the provision of seemingly
irrelevant information may well systematically influence bidding behavior in a detrimental
4
way from a seller’s or an efficiency point of view.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the experi-
mental set-up. Section 3 reviews some testable theoretical results. The analysis of our data
is presented in Section 4. Eventually, Section 5 concludes by relating our findings to other
studies, identifying the lessons to learn, and evaluating the limits of our work.
2 Experimental set-up
We conducted an experiment with a 3×2 between-subjects design as depicted in Table 1. In
Certainty over Uncertainty over
private value private value
No BIN option CN UN
Low BIN price CL UL
High BIN price CH UH
Table 1: Treatments.
one dimension we varied the BIN option—either no BIN option at all (No BIN ), or a BIN
option with a low (Low BIN ) or a high BIN price (High BIN ). Each of the different BIN
option conditions was combined with different degrees of precision of the subjects’ private
information about the value of the commodity. Subjects either knew their private value
(Certainty) or they only knew an interval in which the value was placed (Uncertainty). In
each treatment, subjects played ten auctions in groups of four bidders. We used the partner-
matching protocol, i.e. each group’s composition was the same over all ten rounds. Each
auction followed the following steps:
1. Information about private value. In the Certainty treatments the subjects were informed
about their private value v which was a number chosen from the uniform distribution
over the integers in the interval [65, 135]. In the Uncertainty treatments subjects were
only informed about a lower and upper bound for their private value vmin and vmax.
Furthermore, subjects knew that vmin was drawn from the uniform distribution over
the interval [50, 120] and that the precise value (which was not revealed to the subjects
at this stage) was chosen from the uniform distribution over the interval [vmin, vmax(=
vmin + 30)].
To facilitate across-treatment comparisons, we randomly determined the private values
of the participants only once, i.e. we drew the lower interval boundary and the respective
value within the interval for treatment UN and used the same set of intervals and
values for the other Uncertainty treatments. For the Certainty treatments we used the
midpoints of the drawn intervals as private values.
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2. Decision upon BIN option execution. For the Low BIN and the High BIN treatments, all
subjects were given a common BIN price and asked whether they would like to buy the
good for this particular price. Although each subject had to decide upon an application
for the option, only the decision of one randomly chosen bidder became decisive. If this
subject made use of the BIN option then he bought the good for the BIN price. If this
subject declined the BIN offer the auction started.8
In the Low BIN treatments the BIN price was set to the average of the second and
third highest value. In the High BIN treatments the BIN price was set to the average
of the highest and the second highest value. For the Uncertainty treatments the BIN
prices were calculated from the respective expected values in right the same way. If the
resulting BIN price was not an integer number, it was rounded down. Our intention
was to offer BIN option prices that were sufficiently distinct as to induce different
market performance (and potentially bidding behavior). In particular, in the Certainty
treatments at most one subject (the bidder with the highest valuation) is expected to
apply for the option with the high price, while at most two subjects (the two bidders
with the highest valuations) are expected to apply for the option with a low price.9
3. Bidding decisions in the auction. If no BIN option was available or a subject was selected
who did not apply for the option, an English auction with proxy bidding was executed.
During the auction subjects could at any time submit proxy bids which were higher
than the current price of the auction. At each point in time and for given proxy bids,
the current winner was the subject with the highest current proxy bid and the current
price was equal to the second highest current proxy bid (proxy bid plus one in those
cases where the higher bidder came in later). In case of a tie, precedence was given to
the bidder who submitted the bid first. The bidders were continuously informed about
whether they are the current winning bidder or not and about the current price. For
the treatments with BIN option the forgone BIN price was also displayed. The auction
duration was set on 2 minutes in all treatments, but the auction was extended to at
least another minute if a new proxy bid was submitted by one of the subjects. Only in
case no bid was posted in the last minute, the auction ended. This way subjects always
had the opportunity to react on each others bids and incentives to delay bids until the
last seconds of the auction (sniping) were eliminated.10
4. Feedback. At the end of each round (after a BIN execution or the end of an auction),
8This procedure mimics that the BIN option is only available as long as nobody started to bid (temporary
option). The randomly chosen bidder can be seen as the first to see the good. If he starts to bid he implicitly
declines the BIN offer and eliminates it for all other bidders.
9Actual individual decisions certainly depend on the individual’s preferences as we detail in the next section
and in Appendix A.
10I.e., we used a soft ending rule as discussed in Roth and Ockenfels (2002).
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subjects were informed about the final price of the good, whether they bought it or not,
and what their final payoff is going to be. No additional information about the others’
values, bids or profits was given.
The experiment was computerized and conducted in the experimental computer laboratory
at Maastricht University (Faculty of Economics and Business Administration). The software
was programmed within the z-Tree toolbox of Fischbacher (2007). Subjects were invited via
email to register for a “market experiment” on a website. In total we had 21 sessions with
60 bidder groups (ten for each treatment) of four bidders. In each session subjects received
written instructions (see Appendix B). They could study the instructions at their own pace
and ask clarifying questions privately to the instructors. Before the experiment started,
every subject had to answer some control questions correctly (see Appendix C). After the
experiment, subjects were paid off in cash. The average payoff per subject was about e 15.-
with a session lasting between 80 and 110 minutes. In order to avoid losses due to overbidding,
subjects started with an initial budget of e 9.
3 Testable predictions
To structure the further analysis and to derive some baseline hypotheses, we continue with
a brief review of theoretical results on BIN options that are relevant in our setting.11 In the
remainder of the paper we denote by p∗ the final price in an auction (the price at which the
(fictitious) commodity is sold), and by pB the BIN price (the price at which the (fictitious)
commodity can be bought before the auction starts).
3.1 Theoretical benchmark
Suppose that subjects are risk neutral and maximize their monetary payoff. If this is common
knowledge, it is a weakly dominant strategy for every subject to submit his private value
in the Certainty treatments and the midpoint of the respective interval in the Uncertainty
treatments whenever an auction started. In particular, this is independent of the presence and
the price of the BIN option, because the option becomes unavailable as soon as the auction
starts. Hence, we can formulate a first baseline hypothesis (for a more detailed discussion see
Observation 1 in Appendix A).
Hypothesis 1 (i) The presence of a BIN option has no impact on p∗. (ii) p∗ is independent
of pB.
Hence, a subject who decides upon an application for the option chooses between the expected
utility from an auction (which depends on p∗ but not on pB) and the utility from executing
11For a more detailed discussion of the theoretical background see Appendix A or the original contributions
by Budish and Takeyama (2001), Matthews and Katzman (2006), or Reynolds and Wooders (2006).
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the option (which depends on pB but not on p
∗). As a consequence, for a given configuration
of private values, BIN applications should increase as pB decreases. This provides another
hypothesis for across treatment comparisons (see also Observation 2 in Appendix A).
Hypothesis 2 The lower pB the more applications for the BIN option.
With respect to revenues, recall that in the High BIN treatments pB is between the highest
and the second highest value. Hence, any execution of the option leads to a revenue above
the second highest value (which is the equilibrium price in the auction). In the Low BIN
treatments, however, pB is between second and third highest value and any execution leads
to a revenue below the second highest value. Whether there are applications to the option,
however, depends on the configuration of valuations and individual preferences (as we discuss
in more detail in Appendix A). E.g., a subject’s application decision depends on his risk
attitude or patience.12 However, some configurations of valuations are such that even a risk
neutral and patient subject should apply for the option (because pB is below the subject’s
expectation of p∗). Hence, we expect to observe applications for the option (and therefore
also executions). This leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 (i) Revenues in the High BIN treatment are above revenues in the No BIN
treatment. (ii) Revenues in the Low BIN treatment are below revenues in the No BIN treat-
ment.
Finally, we discuss the impact of a BIN option on efficiency. Thereby, we focus on allocation
efficiency, that is, we call an allocation efficient if the subject with the highest value (or
highest midpoint of the interval in the uncertainty case) receives the (fictitious) commodity.13
If subjects stick to their weakly dominant strategy, an auction always results in an efficient
allocation. More than one bidder applying for the option, however, leads to an inefficient
allocation with a strictly positive probability. Now recall again that in the High BIN treatment
only the subject with the highest valuation gains from executing the option. Hence, no
efficiency loss is to be expected in this case. For the Low BIN treatment, however, more than
one BIN application can be expected for some value-configurations. This leads to the next
hypothesis (see also Observation 3 in Appendix A).
Hypothesis 4 (i) Allocation efficiency in the High BIN treatment does not differ from allo-
cation efficiency in the No BIN treatment. (ii) Allocation efficiency in the Low BIN treatment
is smaller than allocation efficiency in the No BIN treatment.
12Budish and Takeyama (2001), Matthews and Katzman (2006), and Reynolds and Wooders (2006) show
that a BIN option becomes ceteris paribus more attractive for a subject if he is more risk averse or more
impatient.
13To allow for comparisons between Certainty and Uncertainty treatments, we abstract from inefficiencies
that occur due to the randomization over the interval in the Uncertainty treatments, meaning that if the
intervals of two subjects overlap, the subject with the higher midpoint has to win the auction for the allocation
to be efficient.
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3.2 Anchoring
The previous hypotheses are implications of rational behavior. In the following we want to
elicit some consequences on behavior if actors are no longer fully rational. One particular
important psychological bias discussed in the empirical literature (see Section 1) which could
have an effect in our experimental setting is anchoring.
“Anchoring and Adjustment” is a heuristics introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1965)
to describe decision making under uncertainty. In an overview article, Chapman and Johnson
(2002) define an anchoring procedure as one in which “a salient but uninformative number
is presented to subjects before they make a numerical judgement” in such a way that the
uninformative number eventually influences the judgement. The authors thereby emphasize
the importance of a compatibility between the target information and the anchor. In our case,
the BIN price appears as salient but uninformative information for the subsequent bidding
decision. Moreover, the BIN price is compatible with the subject’s willingness to bid. If
subjects stick to the weakly dominant strategy to submit their private value, they possess all
relevant information in the Certainty treatments and no anchoring is to be expected in this
case. Hence, Hypothesis 1–4 should remain valid.
In the Uncertainty treatments, however, subjects might use the BIN price as an anchor
when they determine their willingness to bid (i.e., their private value). In general, this may
well lead to lower or higher prices at the end of an auction compared to treatments without
the former presence of the option (rejecting Hypothesis 1(i) and Hypothesis 3(i) and (ii)).
Moreover, if the BIN price plays the role of an anchor, a subject’s willingness to bid is expected
to raise in the BIN price. Hence, p∗ should be larger for the High BIN than for the Low BIN
treatments which would lead to a rejection of Hypothesis 1(ii).
4 Results
The experiment generates data of 600 auctions (i.e., 100 different auctions, each conducted for
the six different treatments in 10 independent groups). In the following we split the analysis
in two major parts. Subsections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 will take a helicopter view and analyze
efficiency, applications for the BIN option and revenues in total. For statistical tests we
aggregate the data over all rounds for each particular group. This results in 60 independent
observations (six treatments with 10 observations each). Each group within a given treatment
faced different private values and each configuration of values was used once in each treatment.
In order to avoid problems with pairwise equivalent stimuli we use the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test instead of Mann-Whitney-U.
In Subsections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 we focus our analysis on the effect of the presence or absence
of a BIN option on the subsequent auction. When aggregating the data to independent
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observations we therefore took only those rounds into account where an auction resulted in
all compared treatments. In all these comparisons we provide the number of auctions the
analysis is based on.
4.1 Efficiency
Hypothesis 4 suggests that efficiency should not be independent of the presence and price of
the option. In fact, the High BIN treatment should not differ significantly from the No BIN
treatment with respect to efficiency while the Low BIN should. Table 2 displays two different
measures for efficiency (# eff and eff ) and the respective between treatment comparison.
# eff is the fraction of auctions that yields an efficient outcome. This measure is insensitive
to the extent of potential efficiency losses. The second, alternative, measure takes into account
to which extent efficiency is violated, and reads eff = v(winner)
v(highest) (the winner’s valuation divided
by the highest valuation). In particular, eff = 1 if the person with the highest value wins,
and eff = 0 if the winning subject does not value the good at all (in fact, 65135 would be lowest
value for eff that possibly could be observed).
Compare avg eff avg # eff
CN – CL 0.990 >.004 0.944 0.88 >.023 0.65
CN – CH 0.990 ∼.375 0.993 0.88 ∼.266 0.94
CL – CH 0.944 <.004 0.993 0.65 <.004 0.94
UN – UL 0.983 ∼1.00 0.973 0.74 ∼.914 0.74
UN – UH 0.983 ∼.922 0.982 0.74 >.047 0.83
UL – UH 0.973 ∼.492 0.982 0.74 ∼.117 0.83
CN – UN 0.990 ∼.232 0.983 0.88 >.008 0.74
CL – UL 0.944 <.049 0.973 0.65 ∼.109 0.74
CH – UH 0.993 >.064 0.982 0.94 >.055 0.83
Table 2: Efficiency. E.g., >.004 in the first row indicates that the respective efficiency measure is
larger for treatment CN than treatment CL at a significance level of 0.004 (significance is based on a
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (two-sided) with bidder groups being independent observations).
We find that in the Certainty treatments (top triple of rows) a low BIN price leads to
significantly more inefficiency (for both measures) in comparison with no BIN option or with
a high BIN price. In contrast, there is no significant difference between efficiency in the High
BIN and the No BIN treatments. This is in line with Hypothesis 4.
Result 1 (i) eff (CN) = eff (CH) cannot be rejected. Significant with respect to both effi-
ciency measures are the following relations: (ii) eff (CN) > eff (CL), and (iii) eff (CH) >
eff (CL).14
For the Uncertainty treatments (middle triple of rows) only one comparison is found to be
significant for one particular measure. No BIN treatments lead to significantly more auctions
14If not indicated otherwise all results are significant in a (two-sided) Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
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with an efficient allocation (measured by # eff ) than High BIN treatments. Almost identical
values for eff , however, indicate that this result is driven by auctions with a small difference
between highest and second highest valuation. Hence, the Uncertainty treatments do not lend
robust support to any part of Hypothesis 4.
Part of the reason for the incoherence between Hypothesis 4 and the comparisons of Un-
certainty treatments can be found in the last three rows which depict the effect of uncertainty
on efficiency for a given BIN option (or in its absence). For the No Bin and the High BIN
case, uncertainty reduces efficiency (though not significant for the No BIN case measured by
eff ). In contrast, uncertainty seems to increase efficiency in the Low BIN treatments (though
not significant according to # eff ).
To interpret these findings, note that the introduction of uncertainty can affect efficiency
in two ways. A more uncertain environment may lead to different BIN application decisions
and a modified bidding behavior. To evaluate the relative importance of these two aspects,
we continue with an analysis of BIN applications.
4.2 Applications to execute the BIN option
With respect to the number of BIN option applications, Hypothesis 2 indicates that applica-
tions are expected to be less frequent if the price of the option increases. Table 3 confirms
this. Note that Table 3 indicates that subjects did not just follow the rule of thumb to apply
Certainty Uncertainty
No BIN – –
Low BIN 165 : 6/26/65/3/0 162 : 4/39/48/9/0
High BIN 62 : 39/60/1/0/0 75 : 34/58/7/1/0
Table 3: Statistics of the demand for a BIN option. In the baseline treatment the demand is 0 by
definition. The entries in the other fields read the following: 6/26/65/3/0 means that in 6 cases none
demanded the option, in 26 cases 1 subjects out of 4 demanded the option, in 65 cases 2 subjects, in
3 cases 3 subjects and in 0 cases 4 subjects demanded the option. The number before the colon is the
total number of BIN applications, i.e. 6 · 0 + 26 · 1 + 65 · 2 + 3 · 3 + 0 · 4 = 165. Each cell represents
100 auctions with 4 participants and therefore 400 decisions in total.
for the option whenever their private value is above the option price. This would have lead
to 200 applications in the Low BIN and 100 applications in the High BIN case.
A comparison between the Certainty and the Uncertainty treatments, however, is more
subtle. We observe a larger number of BIN applications and a shift to the right of the respec-
tive distribution (more applications by subjects with lower private values) in the Uncertainty
treatments for a high BIN price. This is in line with the expectation that a BIN option should
become more attractive if the environment gets more uncertain (assuming, for instance, risk
averse bidders as detailed in Reynolds and Wooders (2006)). However, this is not observed for
low BIN prices. Here, the number of BIN applications decreases slightly and the respective
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distribution gets more dispersed. To understand this result, observe that it is not a weakly
dominant strategy for a risk averse bidder to submit the expected value (the midpoint of the
interval) in the Uncertainty treatments. His optimal strategy—and the respective expected
payoff from an auction—depends not only on his own degree of risk aversion but also on
the respective beliefs about his opponents’ preferences.15 The lower the option price, the
more subjects are in general tempted to consider the option. Heterogeneity in the beliefs and
preferences would therefore explain the more dispersed distribution. For our purposes it is
nonetheless more important to note that the total number of BIN applications in the Low
BIN treatments does increase due to the introduction of uncertainty and so does the number
of auctions where other subjects than the bidder with the highest value apply. Hence, the
difference between the Certainty and Uncertainty treatments with respect to efficiency cannot
be explained by a change in BIN application decisions. It rather suggests different bidding
behavior.
4.3 Revenue
From a seller’s perspective, the most important aspect of a BIN option is its impact on
revenues (i.e., the price of the option in case of its execution and the final price of the
auction otherwise). Theoretical expectations (according to Hypothesis 3) are that revenues
in the High BIN treatments are larger than without option, and revenues in the Low BIN
treatments are smaller than without option. Table 4 shows, however, that the introduction
Compare Average Revenue
CN – CL 109.48 >.004 104.98
CN – CH 109.48 >.049 108.01
CL – CH 104.98 <.010 108.01
UN – UL 113.48 >.004 103.68
UN – UH 113.48 >.020 109.64
UL – UH 103.68 <.020 109.64
Table 4: Total Revenues. Revenue = pB in case of an execution of the option and Revenue = p
∗
otherwise. Average pB for High BIN treatments was 115.06, and for Low BIN 101.19.
of a BIN option unambiguously reduces revenues (rejecting Hypothesis 3(i)), while revenues
decrease in pB (supporting Hypothesis 3(ii)).
Result 2 The following relations are significant: (i) Revenue(CN) > Revenue(CH) >
Revenue(CL), and (ii) Revenue(UN) > Revenue(UH) > Revenue(UL).
15A risk averse bidder, for instance, who beliefs that the other bidders are less risk averse expects to win the
auction with a small probability and therefore has incentives to execute the option. In contrast if he believes
that other bidders are more risk averse than himself, he expects to win the auction and therefore regards a
BIN option less valuable. The empirical relevance of risk aversion in the context of proxy-auctions has been
emphasized in Shahriar and Wooders (2006).
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The results displayed in Subsection 4.2 suggest that the relatively low revenues in the Low
BIN treatments can well be attributed to more BIN executions (and as a consequence prices
below the dominant strategy equilibrium of an auction). However, any revenue reduction due
to an introduction of a high BIN price cannot be due to BIN executions (unless we frequently
observe final prices above the second highest value in the No BIN treatments, which is not
the case). Whenever the option gets executed in the High BIN treatments, it will yield higher
revenues than in the weakly dominant strategy equilibrium of the auction. Hence, we have
another indicator that the (former) presence of an option affects bidding behavior in the
subsequent auction. In the next subsection we further investigate how bidding behavior (and
in particular the final price of the auction) is affected by the (former) presence of a BIN
option.
4.4 Final auction prices
While benchmark theory (see Hypothesis 1) predicts that final prices of the auction are
independent of presence and price of the option, we argued in Subsection 3.2 that the BIN price
may well serve as an anchor for a subject’s willingness to bid in the Uncertainty treatments
while we do not expect such an effect in the Certainty treatments. Accordingly, we expect
final prices in the Uncertainty treatments to increase in pB while no difference should be
observed in the Certainty treatments. Table 5 depicts the respective results. As motivated
in the beginning of the section we only used those rounds for the aggregation to independent
observations, where the BIN option was not executed. To control for outlayer-driven results
we aggregated the rounds in two different ways: mean and median. The results turn out to
be rather robust.
Compare # auctions Average price p∗ Average price p∗
aggregation via mean aggregation via median
CN – CL 51/100 112.18 ∼.287 111.06 113.10 ∼.285 112.25
CN – CH 84/100 110.12 >.014 107.18 111.55 >.029 107.15
CL – CH 45/100 111.91 >.002 108.87 112.65 >.018 109.10
UN – UL 62/100 112.68 >.014 105.55 114.05 >.012 106.30
UN – UH 81/100 113.52 >.010 108.69 116.70 >.012 110.30
UL – UH 47/100 106.02 ∼.131 109.36 106.60 ∼.264 110.55
Table 5: Average auction prices p∗. The first column depicts the treatments to compare. The second
column provides the number of auctions the comparison is based on. The third and fourth column
display the between-treatment comparison of average auction prices when aggregation takes place via
the mean respectively the median.
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Result 3 The following relations are significant based on average and median (i) p∗(CN) >
p∗(CH), (ii) p∗(CL) > p∗(CH), (iii) p∗(UN) > p∗(UL), and (iv) p∗(UN) > p∗(UH). (v)
p∗(UH) > p∗(UL) is significant on the ten percent level for a one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank
test.
All in all the data clearly rejects Hypothesis 1(i) (no price change due to the introduction of
a BIN option). Only the introduction of a low BIN price for the Certainty treatment does
not significantly push down the price.
Also Hypothesis 1(ii) (dependence on pB) can be rejected. However, the dependency of p
∗
on pB is not as simple as suggested in Section 3.2. Data for the Uncertainty treatments is in
line with the expectation that final prices (p∗) increase in the BIN price (pB) (see Result 3(v)).
Certainty treatments, however, reject such a relationship and demonstrate that final prices
decrease in the price of the option (see Result 3(ii)). Hence, while Uncertainty treatments
lend support to the hypothesis that pB serves as an anchor for a subject’s willingness to pay,
Certainty treatments show that the actual impact of pB is more subtle. As subjects’ know
their private value in the Certainty treatments, a dependence of p∗ on pB suggests that they do
not only care for their own valuation in their bidding decisions—also taking information e.g.,
about their opponents’ values or the willingness to accept of a fictitious seller into account—
and that pB serves as an anchor for this kind of information. In the following subsections we
try to further pin down the way pB influences subjects’ bidding decision.
4.5 Final bid submission
We already saw in Subsection 4.4 that the former presence of a BIN option tends to reduce
the final price of the auction. To investigate this on the individual level, we depict in Table 6
the number of bids that are above the respective BIN price.
Compare # auctions # of final bids above BIN price
CN – CL 51/100 108 >.016 95
CN – CH 84/100 47 >.023 30
UN – UL 62/100 144 >.004 97
UN – UH 81/100 94 >.019 63
Table 6: Statistics over number of bids above the BIN price. The first column depicts the treatments to
compare. The second column provides the number of auctions the comparison is based on. The third
column indicates the number of bids above the respective BIN price and the corresponding significance
value for a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
Result 4 Final bids above the BIN price are significantly less often submitted, if the option
was available.
Hence, some individuals seem reluctant to bid more than they would have paid by executing
the option. This further illustrates the impact of presence and price of a BIN option on
14
bidding behavior. One possible explanation could be that subjects perceive the BIN price as
the valuation of a (fictitious) seller. They might be reluctant to bid above pB because they
do not want to “overpay” him (an argument that could be backed up by theories of social
preferences such as inequity aversion).
Another explanation for the observed behavior would be regret by subjects who did not
apply for the option (and were decisive), and are therefore reluctant to bid more than pB
throughout the auction because they did not use a cheaper option beforehand. We conducted
several regressions of bids on such “regret-histories”, but did not find any support for this
explanation. Another possible explanation of observed behavior is that bidders take pB
as a signal about the other bidders’ private values. This potential explanation is further
investigated in the next subsection.
4.6 An anchor for what?
The fact that final auction prices are not independent of pB in the Certainty treatment sug-
gests that subjects take more information into account than just their own private value when
forming their bidding decision. We know from recent studies on overbidding in second price
auctions that information about other subjects’ values indeed influences bidding decision.
Andreoni et al. (2005) and Cooper and Fang (2006) show that subjects tend to bid more
fiercely if their own value is close to the value of another subject. The authors attribute this
pattern to spiteful behavior (subjects want to raise the price another subject with a value
just above his own has to pay in the end) or the “joy-of-bidding” (subjects regard winning
an auction against a strong opponent as more valuable). Furthermore, subjects can use in-
formation about their opponents’ values for an estimation of their own winning probability
and decide whether bidding is worthwhile in the first place.16
To further distinguish between the different possible impacts of information on other
subjects’ valuation and the respective anchoring function of pB, we compare the final bids
of the second highest value holders for the Low BIN and the High BIN treatments.17 If
bidders indeed take pB as an anchor for the other subjects’ values, spiteful behavior or “joy-
of-winning” would lead to higher bids for a high BIN than for a low BIN price. If, in contrast,
bidders take pB as an anchor for the probability to win the auction, a higher BIN price may
well lead to earlier drop-outs and lower final bids.
An examination of the data using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (two-sided) on the basis
16In fact, subjects almost never follow the dominant strategy to reveal their value to the bid agent and rather
overbid each other incrementally like in an English auction. For this bidding pattern, information about private
values of opponents may also influence the point in time where bidders drop out and stop bidding because
they declare an auction a “mission impossible”.
17We restrict our comparison to the final bids of the second highest value holders because third and fourth
highest value holders often faced current auction prices which they could not overbid anymore. Consequentially
it was only the second value holders who had a strong interest to bid up to his willingness-to-pay.
15
of independent observations lends support for the latter hypothesis. While the final bids of
the second value holders in the Low BIN treatment are not significantly different from their
values (p = .375), the second value holders in the High BIN treatment systematically underbid
(p = .002) by 2.09 ECU on average. Moreover their final bids are significantly lower in the
High BIN than in the Low BIN treatment (p = .010).
5 Concluding remarks
In this study, we investigated the impact of BIN options on efficiency, revenues, and bidding
behavior in a private value proxy-auction. In line with models of rational, payoff maximizing
agents, we find that the introduction of a BIN option tends to reduce allocation efficiency.
In contrast to these models, however, we show that BIN options unambiguously reduce the
seller’s revenue. In particular, the introduction of a temporary BIN option tends to reduce
the final price of a subsequent auction and bids above the BIN price are less often submitted
compared to a control-treatment without option. We discuss how this influence of BIN prices
on bidding behavior can be interpreted as anchoring. For an uncertain environment where
subjects are only informed about an interval for their private values, the BIN price can be
interpreted as an anchor for subject’s actual value. Accordingly, the introduction of an option
matters and final bids tend to increase in the BIN price. For a certainty environment where
subjects are perfectly informed about their private value, final bids are still reduced by the
introduction of the option but decrease in its price. Our data suggests that bidders are
discouraged by high BIN prices in the sense that bidders with the second highest value no
longer bid up to their value but significantly underbid.
Empirical studies such as Dodonova and Koroshilov (2004) or Lee and Malmendier (2006)
suggest that sellers (e.g., in online auctions) may sometimes benefit from cognitive shortcom-
ings of the respective buyers. Then, an obvious conclusion is to take these cognitive limits
into account when designing the (seller-optimal) mechanism. If, for instance, bidders take
the BIN price as an anchor, a sophisticated seller is tempted to set the anchor in such a
way that it enhances his revenue. In fact, it is exactly such a strategy that a seller might
choose on the basis of the afore-mentioned empirical studies. However, our experiment sug-
gests that this kind of “behavioral mechanism design” is anything but straightforward. Our
study demonstrates that a BIN option is not unlikely to reduce seller revenues. Hence, we
demonstrate the existence of “cognitive costs” that are not necessarily compensated by the
revenue-enhancing effects of a BIN option as identified in the theoretical literature (and cor-
roborated by field studies such as Anderson and Singh (2004) or Hendricks et al. (2005) and
laboratory experiments such as Shahriar and Wooders (2006)). Our research suggests to be
aware of cognitive shortcomings (such as e.g., anchoring effects) and highlights the complex
impact of (irrelevant) information in simple bidding processes. From a practical point of view,
16
our experiment supports the design choice at e.g., eBay to not display the BIN price after it
expired and questions its ongoing exposition in the (former) design at biz.com.
An interesting research question is of course in how far sellers actually learn to use the BIN
option. An appealing framework to answer this question has recently been proposed by Grebe
et al. (2006) who invite experienced eBay users to participate in laboratory experiments.
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A Theoretical predictions
In the following we summarize the key findings of theoretical investigations into BIN options18
that apply to our experimental set-up. We assume throughout this appendix that subjects
are rational and maximize their monetary payoff (and that this is common knowledge). The
buyer’s decision whether or not to select the BIN option is a choice between two lotteries (see
Figure 1): Ly (application for the option) and Ln (no application for the option). An optimal
decision depends on which of the two lotteries induces the highest expected utility.
bidder
use BIN-option?
!
!
!
!
!
!!yes! Ly
a
a
a
a
a
aano! Ln
selected?
  
  
  
 yes! piyy
```````
no! piyn
  
  
  
 yes! piny
```````
no! pinn
Figure 1: The BIN decision is a choice between lotteries.
In both lotteries the state with the reference bidder being decisive occurs with probability
one divided by the number of bidders. With the remaining probability mass the reference
bidder is not selected to be decisive in both lotteries. If he is not decisive, his continuation
payoff depends on the BIN application decisions of the other bidders and bidding behavior
in the auction. As subjects decide upon BIN applications simultaneously, the former cannot
be influenced by the reference bidder’s application decision. Moreover, private values imply
that also bidding behavior should be independent of the BIN application decisions. Hence,
we get piyn = pinn and an optimal BIN decision for an expected utility maximizing individual
depends on which of the two other continuation payoffs, piyy or piny, is higher. For further
reference, we summarize as follows.19
Observation 1 (i) p∗ is independent of pB. (ii) A subject applies for the BIN option if and
only if piyy > piny.
18See Budish and Takeyama (2001), Matthews and Katzman (2006), and Reynolds and Wooders (2006). In
fact, Matthews and Katzman (2006) emphasize the role of “patience” for the economic performance of BIN
options. We abstain from a more detailed discussion of subjects with a certain degree of impatience as the
time-frame of our experiment seems to be unfitting for such considerations.
19Recall that we denote final prices of an auction by p∗ and the price of the BIN option by pB .
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A.1 BIN applications
In the remainder of this appendix, we assume that there are n risk neutral bidders20 with
private valuations that are identically and independently distributed via a differentiable cu-
mulative distribution function F with support on the closed unit interval.21 Moreover all
bidders know the BIN price pB. Because of risk neutrality we can restrict analysis to the
Certainty treatment. Results for the Uncertainty treatment are made by considering the
midpoint of the respective interval.
For the reference bidder with private value v the continuation payoff piyy is equal to v−pB.
The continuation payoff piny is equal to the payoff of a standard auction and reads
piny(v) = vF
n−1(v)− (n− 1)
∫
v
0
v′f(v′)Fn−2(v′) dv′.
For the bidder it is optimal to execute the BIN option if and only if the continuation payoff
piyy exceeds the continuation payoff piny(v) = v − pB.
For the situation with four bidders (n = 4) with private valuations chosen from the support
[0, 1] according to a uniform distribution (F ∼ Un), the continuation payoff piny simplifies to
1
4v
4. Next we find that each bidder should execute the BIN option if and only if v−pB ≥
1
4v
4.
Let v¯(pB) denote the critical value above which the BIN option should be chosen. Clearly
v¯(pB) is a solution to the equation v − pB =
1
4v
4. The only real-valued solution on [0, 1] is
displayed in Figure 2.
pB
v¯(pB)
Figure 2: Optimal BIN application
Hence, in expectation the following result holds.22
Observation 2 The lower pB the more applications for the BIN option.
20In fact, we assume common knowledge of risk neutrality.
21Note that in the experiment the set of possible private valuations was restricted to integers and, hence,
discrete. We have chosen the more familiar set-up in this section for expositional ease. All observations are
nonetheless robust to such modifications of the model.
22Monotonicity statements in Observation 2 and 3 are certainly statements on weak monotonicity.
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A.2 Efficiency
In this paper, we focus on allocation efficiency (i.e., if the subject who values the (fictitious)
commodity most actually receives it). For the Uncertainty treatments we call an allocation
efficient if the buyer with the highest midpoint of the respective valuation interval receives
the commodity. If subjects stick to the weakly dominant strategy to reveal their (expected)
valuation, the only source of inefficiency in the Certainty treatment is the execution of a
BIN option by a subject that does not hold the highest valuation of all participants. Hence,
Observation 2 indicates that
Observation 3 (i) The introduction of a BIN option reduces allocation efficiency. (ii) The
lower pB the lower allocation efficiency.
For the uncertainty treatment, Observation 2-3, depend on (common knowledge of) risk
neutrality. The experiment of Shahriar and Wooders (2006) gives an indication that risk-
aversion may matter in our experiment. It follows from Reynolds and Wooders (2006) that
all observations still hold if subjects have identical attitudes towards risk. If subjects differ
with respect to their degree of risk aversion (and their beliefs about other subjects’ degree of
risk aversion) a bidder with a lower private value can e.g., outbid a more risk averse bidder
with a higher private value. This makes a subject’s bidding behavior and expected payoff from
an auction dependent on its own degree of risk aversion and its beliefs upon other subjects’
degree of risk aversion. Such effects can thus be expected to have an impact on allocation
efficiency, final prices in an auction (and thereby a subject’s expected payoff from an auction),
and BIN option executions.
B Instructions
Dear participant,
thank you for taking part in this experiment!
It will last about 1.5 hours. You will be compensated according to your performance. In
order to ensure that the experiment takes place in an optimal setting, we would like to ask
you to follow the general rules during the whole experiment:
• Do not communicate with your fellow students!
• Please, switch off your mobile phone!
• Please read the instructions carefully! It is important that you understand the rules
of the experiment. If something is not explained well, please raise your hand. We will
answer your question privately. The instructions are identical for all participants.
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• You may make notes on this instruction sheet if you wish.
• After the experiment please remain seated till you are paid off.
• If you do not obey the rules, the data becomes useless for us. Therefore we will have to
exclude you from this experiment and you will not receive any compensation.
Your decisions are anonymous. Neither your fellow students nor anybody else will ever learn
them from us.
General set-up At the beginning of the experiment, participants are randomly matched
into groups of four bidders. The experiment consists of 10 rounds (auctions). In each round a
fictitious commodity is auctioned off. If you win the auction you do not receive the commodity
but you receive an amount of money equal to your private value v (expressed in Experimental
Currency Units (ECU)). In return you have to pay the price (p) resulting from the auction
(see below). I.e. you make a profit of v − p.
The private value . . .
[Certainty treatment] or [Uncertainty treatment]
Who wins the auction and what price the winner has to pay is determined in the following
way:
[With BIN] or [Without BIN]
. . . all participants can submit their own bids. The auction works with proxy-bidding. Par-
ticipants submit the maximum they are willing to bid (their proxy bid) to a bidding agent
who acts as follows. Suppose your bid is equal to b. If this bid is below the current price of
the auction (p), nothing happens. If it is above the current price, the bidding agent submits
a bid just above the current price (i.e. p+ 1). If no one else has submitted a bid above p+ 1
and no one else submits a higher bid subsequently, the respective bidder will be the winner
of the auction and will pay p+ 1 (making a profit of v − p− 1).
If someone else has submitted a bid above p + 1, his bidding agent submits p + 2. If
your bid is also higher than p + 2 your own bidding agent submits p + 3 and so on. Stated
differently, your bidding agent overbids any competing bidding agent as long as the bid does
not exceed the willingness to pay that you have submitted to your agent.
Bid submission is costless and every participant can submit as many bids as he likes.
However, the bidding agent only recognizes an increase in the willingness to bid (i.e. it is not
possible to reduce the maximum bid throughout the auction). Furthermore, he ignores bids
below 1 and above 200.
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Displayed Information Bidders are informed . . .
[Certainty treatment] or [Uncertainty treatment]
. . . Furthermore, the current price (i.e the price that would have to be paid by the participant
who has submitted the highest bid if nothing else happens until the end of the auction) is
displayed on the screen. Furthermore, each bidder is informed wether he or someone else has
submitted the current highest bid.
End of the Auction The auction ends after 2 minutes if there are no bid submissions in
the last 60 seconds. Otherwise, the auction will be extended to a minute. The auction only
ends if there are no incoming bids for at least 60 seconds. At the end of the auction, the
winning bidder is selected, the commodity is allocated to him, and he has to pay the final
price of the auction.
ECU’s are transformed into Euros according to the following conversion rate: 1Euro =
5ECU . You will obtain an initial endowment of 9 Euro. If you make losses in an auction
these will be deducted from your previous gains (or from your initial endowment).
Note that if the losses exceed previous gains and your initial endowment, we will
ask you to pay the difference. You will receive your final profit in cash at the end of the
experiment.
After the experiment, we would like to ask you to complete a short questionnaire.
Thank you again and good luck with the experiment!
[Certainty treatment]
. . . will be determined randomly and independently for every bidder. It will be drawn from
the interval between 65 and 135. Each value (including 65 and 135) is equally likely. Before
the auction starts, your private value v will be shown to you.
. . . about their private value v.
[Uncertainty treatment]
. . . will be determined randomly and independent for every bidder as follows. First, the
computer draws a random number between 50 and 120 (we will refer to this number as vmin
from now on). Each number between 50 and 120 is equally likely. vmin is a lower bound for
your private value. Afterwards the computer draws a number between 0 and 30 (we will refer
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to this number as x from now on). Again each number between 0 and 30 is equally likely.
Your private value v is now determined by v = vmin+x. Stated differently, your private value
is in the interval [vmin, vmin+30] and each value between vmin and vmin+30 = vmax is equally
likely.
Before the auction starts, vmin and vmax (but not x or v) will be shown to you. Hence,
you will only know an interval in which your private value v lies.
. . . about the interval for their private value (i.e. vmin and vmax).
[With BIN]
Step 1 (Buy it now?) At the beginning of every session you have to decide wether you
want to make use of the “buy-it-now” function (i.e. to buy the commodity at a fixed price
pB). The respective decisions of all the participants are collected and the computer randomly
selects one participant. The decision of this participant will determine the further events.
If the selected participant has decided to use the “buy-it-now” function, he receives the
commodity (i.e. a payoff equal to his private valuation (v)) and has to pay the “buy-it-now”-
price pB. In that event, the selected participant’s profit is v − pB and the other participant’s
profits are zero. If the selected participant has decided not to use the “buy-it-now” function,
the auction starts.
Step 2 (Auction) If an auction starts, . . .
[Without BIN]
After the auction starts, . . .
C Control questions
Please give the answers to the following questions. Then raise your arm. One of the experi-
menters will come to your place and check whether everything is correct.
1.) [Certainty treatment] or [Uncertainty treatment]
2.) Assume somebody else currently submitted the highest proxy bid of 110. Assume further
you observe a current price of 95. You submit a proxy bid of 103. What happens?
The price goes up to 103. The other person remains the highest proxy bidder.
The price moves to 103. You become the highest proxy bidder.
The price stays at 95 because you could not exceed the others proxy bid.
The price goes up to 110. The other person remains the highest proxy bidder.
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3.) Assume 4 participants A, B, C, D. Each participant submits a proxy bid and does not
change this proxy bid anymore. First A submits 56, then B submits 123, then C submits
89, eventually D submits 102. Who buys the object?
A B C D
4.) What price does the buyer have to pay?
123 102 56 180
5.) Assume you buy the commodity for a price of 114. Your private value for the commodity
is 119. What is the profit you make?
6.) Assume you buy the commodity for a price of 117. Your value for the commodity is 99.
What is the profit you make?
[Certainty treatment]
Assume you have a private value of 78 for the commodity. What can you conclude about the
values of the other participants in your auction?
Their value is also 78.
Their value can be 78 but can also be different.
Their value must be different from 78.
[Uncertainty treatment]
a.) Assume you have a value between 78 and 108 for the commodity. What can you conclude
about the values of the other participants in your auction?
Their value is also between 78 and 108.
Their value might be between 78 and 108 or might not fall into that interval.
Their value must be either below 78 or above 108.
b.) Suppose you have a value between 72 and 102.
The probability to have a value of 75 is larger than to have a value of 86.
The probability to have a value of 75 is smaller than to have a value of 86.
The probability to have a value of 75 equals the probability to have a value of 86.
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